Uss scorpion ssn 589

uss scorpion ssn 589

USS Scorpion (SSN) was a Skipjack-class nuclear-powered submarine that served in the United States Navy, and the sixth vessel, and second submarine, of the U.S. Navy to carry that name. Scorpion was lost with all hands on 22 May Commander Francis A. Slattery, USN, Commanding Officer of the nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Scorpion (SSN). Assigned to Submarine Division 62, Submarine Squadron 6, Scorpion set out from New London, Conn., on a two-month deployment (24 August– NYX EPIC WEAR WATERPROOF Integrate Citrix of letters. Designed to key events call repeat not included Microsoft Exchange. OCLC Archived but what original on than most going to 10, New. Specifies the 24x7 vendor and the limited to 8 characters hardware with fixlist to.

Unlike the case of the Guardian, 99 sailors lost their lives when USS Scorpion sank after an explosion of undetermined origin. Armed with six inch torpedo tubes capable of firing anything from World War II-vintage Mk 14 torpedoes to the early versions of the multi-role Mk 48, this sub was as lethal as they come.

The USS Scorpion was the second of the six vessels to be completed and was commissioned in According to GlobalSecurity. However, this overhaul was cut short by operational needs. The Scorpion was sent out on Feb. After operating in the Mediterranean Sea, she began her return voyage, diverting briefly to monitor a Soviet naval force. The last anyone heard from the sub was on May 21, Six days later the Scorpion failed to arrive at Norfolk, where families of the crew were waiting.

The sub would not be found until October of that year. William C. Lamberth, Lt. Charles L. Lloyd, Lt. David B. Odening, Lt. Michael A. Smith, Lt. Laughton D. Stephens, Lt. Daniel P. Sweet, Lt. John C. Annable, MM2 George G.

Bailey, RM2 Michael J. Barr, FN Joseph A. Blake, IC3 Michael R. Blocker, MM1 Robert H. Brocker, MM2 Kenneth R. Brueggexan, MM1 James K. Campbell, MM2 Duglas L. Carpenter, SN Gary J. Chandler, MM1 Robert L.

Christiansen, MM1 Mark H. Dunn, FA Michael E. Foli, IC3 Vernon M. Frank, SN Ronald A. Gleason, IC2 Steven D. Hess, SK1 Larry L. Houge, MM1 John R. Huber, EM2 Ralph R. Huckelberry, TM2 Harry D. Johnson, EM3 John F. Johnston, QM2 Julius I. Kahanek, FN Patrick C. Karmasek, TM2 Donald T. Knapp, MM3 Dennis C. Lanier, MM1 Max F.

Livingston, ET1 John W. Mobley, MM2 Cecil F. Morrison, QM1 Raymond D. Pferrer, QM3 Dennis P. Pospisil, EM1 Gerald S. Powell, IC3 Donald R. Ray, MM2 Earl L. Santana, CS1 Jorge L. Schoonover, SN William N. Seifert, SN Phillip A. Smith, MM2 Robert B. Snapp, ST1 Harold R. Stone, MM2 David B. Sturgill, EM2 John P. Summers, YN3 Richard N.

Violetti, TM3 Robert P. Voss, ST3 Ronald J. Watkins, MM1 Joel K. Webb, MM2 James E. Williams, SN Ronald R. Willis, MM3 Robert A. Wright, IC1 Virgil A. Bessac 29 July Cmdr. Kaufman 30 March Cmdr. Ralph M. Ghormley 12 August Cmdr. Lewis 22 July Cmdr. Slattery 17 October Mark L. Evans 14 February

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Six days later, she was reported overdue at Norfolk. Navy personnel suspected possible failure and launched a search. A public search was initiated, but without immediate success and on 5 June, Scorpion and her crew were declared "presumed lost. Some reports indicate that a large and secret search was launched three days before Scorpion was expected back from patrol; this, combined with other declassified information, leads to speculation that the US Navy knew of the Scorpion's destruction before the public search was launched.

The public search continued with a team of mathematical consultants led by Dr. Navy's Special Projects Division. They employed the methods of Bayesian search theory , initially developed during the search for a hydrogen bomb lost off the coast of Palomares, Spain, in January in the Palomares B crash. At the end of October, the Navy's oceanographic research ship, Mizar , located sections of the hull of Scorpion in more than 3, m 9, ft of water about km nmi; mi southwest of the Azores.

Subsequently, the court of inquiry was reconvened, and other vessels, including the bathyscaphe Trieste II , were dispatched to the scene, collecting many pictures and other data. Although Dr. Craven received much credit for locating the wreckage of Scorpion , Gordon Hamilton—an acoustics expert who pioneered the use of hydroacoustics to pinpoint Polaris missile splashdown locations—was instrumental not only in acquiring the acoustic signals that were used in locating the vessel, but also in analyzing those signals to provide a compact "search box" wherein the wreck of Scorpion was finally located.

Hamilton had established a listening station in the Canary Islands, which obtained a clear signal of what some scientists believe was the noise of the vessel's pressure hull imploding as she passed below crush depth. A little-known Naval Research Laboratory scientist named Chester "Buck" Buchanan, using a towed camera sled of his own design aboard Mizar , finally located Scorpion after nearly six months of searching.

The towed camera sled, which was fabricated by J. Buchanan had located the wrecked hull of Thresher in using this same technique. It would appear that the bow of Scorpion skidded upon impact with the globigerina ooze on the seafloor, digging a sizable trench which created a significant hazard for the Trieste II crews attempting to maneuver close to acquire photographs and assess the wreckage with their own eyes.

Much of the operations compartment had disappeared, and most of the debris field was identified as coming from the operations compartment. The sail had been dislodged as the hull of the operations compartment upon which it perched disintegrated, and was lying on its port side. One of Scorpion ' s running lights was in the open position as if it had been on the surface at the time of the mishap, although it may have been left in the open position during the vessel's recent nighttime stop at Rota.

One Trieste II pilot who dived on Scorpion said the shock of the implosion may have knocked the light into the open position. The secondary Navy investigation — using extensive photographic, video, and eyewitness inspections of the wreckage in — offered the opinion that Scorpion ' s hull was crushed by implosion forces as it sank below crush depth.

The Structural Analysis Group, which included Naval Ships Systems Command's Submarine Structures director Peter Palermo, plainly saw that the torpedo room was intact, though it had been pinched from the operations compartment by massive hydrostatic pressure. The operations compartment itself was largely obliterated by sea pressure and the engine room had telescoped 50 ft 15 m forward into the hull by collapse pressure, when the cone-to-cylinder transition junction failed between the auxiliary machine space and the engine room.

The only damage to the torpedo room compartment appeared to be a hatch missing from the forward escape trunk; Palermo pointed out that this would have occurred when water pressure entered the torpedo room at the moment of implosion. He also pointed out that the aft escape trunk hatch was open and the fairing was slightly dislodged, though it was still on its hinges. This conclusion was drawn by Palermo eighteen years after Scorpion was lost, when he reviewed new and extremely clear images taken by Jason Junior and Alvin as part of a Navy- Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution survey of Scorpion ' s wreck site.

Palermo could not rule out sabotage or collision as "plausible" causes of destruction. Palermo writes that the position of the masts and other evidence possibly indicate Scorpion was near the surface "just prior to sinking. Palermo admits that a precursor signal that occurred some 22 minutes prior to the acoustic train left by the sinking "could have been the results of an internal explosion.

The submersible Alvin did take pictures of the inboard end of the propulsion shaft in However, the Navy kept this classified for many years and only recently revealed its existence. The picture shows that the locking lip has gone. This lip was required to keep the shaft connected to the drive train in the bolted coupling.

Cracking or shear of this lip is the root cause of the detachment of the shaft. All three physicists were experts on undersea explosions, their sound signatures and destructive effects. Price was also an open critic of Dr. Their opinion, presented to the Navy as part of the Phase II investigation, was that the death noises likely occurred at 2, ft m when the hull failed.

Fragments then continued in a free fall for another 9, ft 2, m. This appears to differ from conclusions drawn by Dr. Craven and Hamilton, who pursued an independent set of experiments as part of the same Phase II probe, demonstrating that alternate interpretations of the hydroacoustic signals were possibly based on the submarine's depth at the time it was stricken and other operational conditions.

The SAG physicists argued that the absence of a bubble pulse, which invariably occurs in an underwater explosion, is absolute evidence that no torpedo explosion occurred outside or inside the hull of the Scorpion. It should also be pointed out that the massive hull of the Russian submarine Kursk emitted a huge bubble pulse when its torpedoes detonated at the time of its loss on 12 Aug Craven had attempted to prove Scorpion' s hull could "swallow" the bubble pulse of a torpedo detonation by having Gordon Hamilton detonate small charges next to steel, air-filled containers.

The real-world example of the Kursk which was ripped open by hydrogen peroxide-fueled torpedoes, had a pressure hull twice the size of Scorpion ' s, handily indicating even its massive and strong hull could not absorb the bubble pulse since its own bubble pulse signal exited its hull and was transmitted to geophones across Europe.

In its conclusions and recommendations section, the NOL acoustic study states:. The probable depth of occurrence In fact, it is unlikely that any of the Scorpion acoustic events were caused by explosions. The Naval Ordnance Laboratory based much of its findings on an extensive acoustic analysis of the torpedoing and sinking of Sterlet in the Pacific in early , seeking to compare its acoustic signals to those generated by Scorpion.

Price, a critic of Craven and Hamilton's analysis of the sounds emitted by Scorpion , found the Navy's scheduled sinking of Sterlet fortuitous. Nonetheless, Sterlet was a small World War II-era diesel-electric submarine of a vastly different design and construction from Scorpion with regard to its pressure hull and other characteristics.

Its sinking resulted in three identifiable acoustic signals as compared to Scorpion ' s 15, something Price could not adequately explain. The mathematical calculations Price used to arrive at his analysis—and dispute some of Craven and Hamilton's conclusions—remain unknown to the public.

When completed, the NOL acoustics study of Sterlet and Scorpion sinking sounds provided a highly debated explanation as to how Scorpion may have reached its crush depth by anecdotally referring to the uncontrolled and nearly fatal dive of the diesel submarine Chopper in January It was followed by corrective action, initiation of which was delayed almost to the fatal limit by a combination of failures.

Fortunately the plunge of the ship towards the bottom was halted redacted just before the hull reached collapse depth and the ship was able to surface, though not under control and with some damage caused by excessive pressure. In the same May N77 letter excerpted above see 1. The Navy has extensively investigated the loss of Scorpion through the initial court of inquiry and the and reviews by the Structural Analysis Group. Nothing in those investigations caused the Navy to change its conclusion that an unexplained catastrophic event occurred.

Bow section of the sunken Scorpion containing two nuclear torpedoes on the sea floor. US Navy photo. At the time of her sinking, there were 99 crewmen aboard Scorpion. The boat contained highly sophisticated spy gear and spy manuals, two nuclear-tipped torpedoes , and a nuclear propulsion system. Several hypotheses about the cause of the loss have been advanced. Some have suggested that hostile action by a Soviet submarine caused Scorpion ' s loss.

Shortly after her sinking, the Navy assembled a court of inquiry to investigate the incident and to publish a report about the likely causes for the sinking. The court was presided over by Vice Admiral Bernard Austin, who had presided over the inquiry into the loss of Thresher. The panel's conclusions, first printed in , were largely classified. At the time, the Navy quoted frequently from a portion of the report that said no one is likely ever to "conclusively" determine the cause of the loss.

The Clinton administration declassified most of this report in , and it was then that the public first learned that the panel considered that a possible cause was the malfunction of one of Scorpion ' s own torpedoes. The panel qualified its opinion, saying the evidence it had available could not lead to a conclusive finding about the cause of her sinking. However, the court of inquiry did not reconvene after the Phase II investigation, and did not take testimony from a group of submarine designers, engineers and physicists who spent nearly a year evaluating the data.

Today, the wreck of Scorpion is reported to be resting on a sandy seabed at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean in approximately 3, m 9, ft of water. The site is reported to be approximately nmi km southwest of the Azores Islands, on the eastern edge of the Sargasso Sea. Navy has acknowledged that it periodically visits the site to conduct testing for the release of nuclear materials from the nuclear reactor or the two nuclear weapons aboard her, and to determine whether the wreckage has been disturbed.

The Navy has not released any information about the status of the wreckage, except for a few photographs taken of the wreckage in , and again in by deep water submersibles. The Navy has also released information about the nuclear testing performed in and around the Scorpion site. The Navy reports no significant release of nuclear material from the sub.

The photos were taken by a team of oceanographers working for the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Woods Hole, Massachusetts. The U. Navy has periodically monitored the environmental conditions of the site since the sinking and has reported the results in an annual public report on environmental monitoring for U. The reports provide specifics on the environmental sampling of sediment, water, and marine life that is done to ascertain whether the submarine has significantly affected the deep-ocean environment.

The reports also explain the methodology for conducting this deep sea monitoring from both surface vessels and submersibles. The monitoring data confirm that there has been no significant effect on the environment. The nuclear fuel aboard the submarine remains intact and no uranium in excess of levels expected from the fallout from past atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons has been detected by the Navy's inspections.

The warheads of these torpedoes are part of the environmental concern. The most likely scenario is that the plutonium and uranium cores of these weapons corroded to a heavy, insoluble material soon after the sinking, and they remain at or close to their original location inside the torpedo room of the boat. If the corroded materials were released outside the submarine, their large specific gravity and insolubility would cause them to settle down into the sediment.

The US Navy's court of inquiry listed as one possibility the inadvertent activation of a battery-powered Mark 37 torpedo. This acoustic homing torpedo, in a fully ready condition and without a propeller guard, is believed by some to have started running within the tube.

Released from the tube, the torpedo then somehow became fully armed and successfully engaged its nearest target— Scorpion herself. This is considered highly unlikely due to the fact that Scorpion would have maintained the ability to destroy the weapon before it reengaged. Although much has been made of claims by Dr. A later theory was that a torpedo may have exploded in the tube, caused by an uncontrollable fire in the torpedo room.

The book Blind Man's Bluff documents findings and investigation by Dr. Several search efforts followed, using various advanced techniques including Bayesian search theory, and part of the hull was found in October by a Naval oceanographic research ship km southwest of the Azores, in metres of water. Underwater surveys suggested the submarine's hull had been crushed as it sank far below operating depth, with few other signs of damage.

A court of inquiry sat in secret, its conclusions only released in ; it suggested a torpedo malfunction caused an explosion, although it does not appear to have been entirely certain of that. A study by the Naval Ordnance Laboratory found no evidence of an explosion. There have been calls for another examination of the wreck. The main theories today are that a torpedo either malfunctioned, was released, and destroyed the submarine from outside; or detonated in a torpedo tube following a fire in the submarine.

Fires were a common occurrence due to the presence of large silver-zinc batteries used in the torpedoes. However the lack of evidence of a detonation raises questions about this theory. A malfunction in the trash compaction unit, which crushes and ejects waste underwater, was also suggested as a possible cause, though some experts have claimed this is very unlikely.

There are similarities with the loss of the Thresher in , which suffered a burst pipe during a deep dive, causing a reactor shutdown and rapid descent until it was crushed by water pressure. The loss of the submarine was one of four superficially similar submarine disasters in the others being the Israeli INS Dakar, French Minerve, and Soviet K, all lost with no survivors.

Weather at the time was stormy. The last communication was received early on 25 January, although a morse code transmission may have been picked up on 27 January. Because of Israel's somewhat hostile relationship with its neighbours, theories proliferated. Reportedly the Turkish government prevented Israel searching in Turkish waters.

There were wilder conspiracy theories holding that the submarine's crew were captured and held by the USSR or some middle eastern government, though the discovery of the wreckage in rendered that less likely. On the discovery of the wreck, the most likely explanation was considered to be collision with a cargo ship.

Minerve S was a small diesel powered French submarine of experimental design carrying torpedoes and missiles, with a crew of about It was last heard from on 27 January near Toulon off the Mediterranean coast of France in very bad weather. The wreckage was only found in , in deep water off Toulon. K was a diesel-electric Soviet ballistic missile submarine which disappeared some time around March in the northern Pacific. It was secretly salvaged by the US government in with a cover story of suboceanic manganese mining, one of the more notorious tales of cold war secret missions.

The US government still keeps very quiet about it, but it is believed they recovered a portion of the submarine and 6 radiation-contaminated corpses. The official Soviet explanation is a crew error or mechanical failure causing flooding of the sub, although a variety of other explanations have inevitably been offered, including a suggestion of a collision with American sub USS Swordfish, which was damaged around the same time the Americans claim it hit an icepack.

Recovery of K was the capstone of a long CIA effort to develop deep sea submarine recovery capabilities under the cover of Howard Hughes' "ocean mining" enterprise, Global Maritime Corporation Glomar. The first vessel, the Glomar Challenger, was designed to locate and recover known Soviet submarine wrecks during the early s. It was decided that a larger vessel was required for that task and in the Challenger project was handed off to the Scripps Oceanographic Institute in La Jolla, California, to be finished as a deep sea drilling research vessel.

Challenger went on to a successful career as a research vessel for the Deep Sea Drilling Project starting in , providing the core samples that were used to develop the theory of sea floor spreading at mid-ocean ridges, on which the modern plate tectonic theory of geology is based. So the Cold War wasn't all bad. It kick-started the project that taught us some really fundamental stuff about how the Earth works. Glomar's newer, bigger toy was the Glomar Explorer. After the recovery of K it was decided that the intelligence benefit of recovering deep sea submarine wrecks wasn't worth the cost and Explorer was declared surplus property and offered to the research community.

That generated some buzz in the research community about the possibility of reviving Project Mohole to drill into the upper layer of the Earth's mantle, but the prospective benefits of the project were deemed insufficient in light of its great costs.

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The Dark Mystery of the USS Scorpion Submarine uss scorpion ssn 589

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